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The Legal Implications of Synthetic and
Manipulated Media
Thomas E. Kadri
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – November 15, 2019

Ahead of the U.S. 2020 presidential election, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace convened more than 100 experts from three dozen
organizations inside and outside Silicon Valley in private meetings to help address
the challenges that synthetic and manipulated media pose for industry,
government, and society more broadly. Among other things, the meetings
developed a common understanding of the potential for synthetic and manipulated
media circulated on technology platforms to disrupt the upcoming presidential
election, generated definitions of “inappropriate” election-related synthetic and
manipulated media that have informed platform content moderation policies, and
equipped platforms with playbooks of effective and ethical responses to synthetic
and manipulated media. Carnegie commissioned four short papers on the legal,
ethical, and efficacy dimensions of election-related synthetic and manipulated
media to brief meeting participants, and now the broader public, on the state-ofplay.

Digital falsifications pose dangers for social media, governments, and society. In
particular, the rise of “digitized impersonations” increasingly concern lawmakers
and scholars who recognize the risks they pose to both individuals and society. 1 To
address these risks, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace convened a
series of meetings aimed at reducing opportunities for digital forgeries to subvert
the upcoming 2020 U.S. election. This memo informs the series by outlining the
potential legal implications of synthetic or manipulated media with a view to
helping platforms define what constitutes proper and improper digital falsifications
in the context of the election.
Media can take various forms, and rapidly developing technology will surely lead
to new types in the future. This memo focuses on just two kinds: synthetic media
and manipulated media. For the purposes of this series, “synthetic media”—
sometimes called deepfakes—are digital falsifications of images, video, and audio
created using an editing process that is automated through AI techniques, whereas

“manipulated media” are any other digital falsification of images, video, and
audio.2
Not all uses of synthetic or manipulated media are harmful. Indeed, they can serve
many laudable purposes. Consider, for example, the enhancements they could
bring in the realm of education. In teaching about the assassination of former
president John F. Kennedy, these media could allow people to hear the speech he
was due to give on the day of his death in his own voice, as one UK-based
company has now done.3 Similarly, imagine the powerful artistic uses of these
media, such as the digital manipulation in Forrest Gump where doctored video
footage portrayed three past presidents saying things they never said. 4 Synthetic
and manipulated media can also enhance autonomy and equality, particularly for
people with disabilities who might use the technology to virtually engage with life
experiences that would be impossible in a conventional sense.5 Moreover, these
media can spur valuable political speech, as when a Belgian political party created
a deepfake depicting U.S. President Donald Trump giving a fictional address
where he says: “As you know I had the balls to withdraw from the Paris climate
agreement. And so should you.”6 Although Trump never used those words in
abandoning the agreement, the political party used this tool to “start a public
debate” to “draw attention to the necessity to act on climate change.” 7
But some digital falsifications are not so salutary. Indeed, many uses could lead to
grave individual and social harms—particularly in the political context. Consider
this list of hypothetical scenarios catalogued by Robert Chesney and Danielle
Citron:
• Fake videos could feature public officials taking bribes, displaying racism,
or engaging in adultery.
• Politicians and other government officials could appear in locations where
they were not, saying or doing horrific things that they did not.
• Fake videos could place them in meetings with spies or criminals, launching
public outrage, criminal investigations, or both.
• Soldiers could be shown murdering innocent civilians in a war zone,
precipitating waves of violence and even strategic harms to a war effort.
• A deep fake might falsely depict a white police officer shooting an unarmed
black man while shouting racial epithets.
• A fake audio clip might “reveal” criminal behavior by a candidate on the eve
of an election.
• Falsified video appearing to show a Muslim man at a local mosque
celebrating the Islamic State could stoke distrust of, or even violence
against, that community.

•

•

•

A fake video might portray an Israeli official doing or saying something so
inflammatory as to cause riots in neighboring countries, potentially
disrupting diplomatic ties or sparking a wave of violence.
False audio might convincingly depict U.S. officials privately “admitting” a
plan to commit an outrage overseas, exquisitely timed to disrupt an
important diplomatic initiative.
A fake video might depict emergency officials “announcing” an impending
missile strike on Los Angeles or an emergent pandemic in New York City,
provoking panic and worse.8

Falsifications like these could spread with devastating effect during election
season. They could erode the public’s sense of trust in the news—or even in the
very idea of truth—upon which an informed electorate depends. Worse still, a
well-timed release of a convincing digital falsification could sway an election if
enough voters believed it and the candidate had no time to debunk it effectively.
What are the potential legal responses to digital falsifications? An outright legal
ban on synthetic and manipulated media would violate the First Amendment
because “falsity alone” does not remove expression from First Amendment
protection, and many digital falsifications would be constitutionally protected
speech.9 As a result, the mere specter of the First Amendment curtails many
legislative efforts to regulate these media. Nevertheless, the following legal
regimes have the potential to address certain problems posed by digital
falsifications in ways consistent with the First Amendment.10
Intellectual Property: One potential source of legal liability could be copyright law.
Because some digital falsifications rely on copyrighted content, unauthorized use
of that content could lead to monetary damages and a notice-and-takedown
procedure to remove it. The person who created the content usually owns the
copyright, and thus a person may have a legal claim if she is depicted in synthetic
or manipulated media that uses material of her own creation. Significant legal
hurdles will arise, however, because defendants will argue that the falsification is
“fair use” of the copyrighted material, intended for educational, artistic, or other

expressive purposes—a defense to liability under copyright law that in part turns
on the question whether the falsification is sufficiently “transformed” from the
original such that it receives protection.
Right of Publicity: Another option might be the right of publicity—a state-law tort
that prohibits unauthorized use of a person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity.11 Again, however, many digital falsifications will be immune from
liability under this tort because of First Amendment concerns, as well as related
statutory and common-law exceptions for material that is “newsworthy” or in the
“public interest.”12 Some states also restrict the tort’s scope to “commercial” uses
of a person’s identity, such as in advertisements, meaning that many digital
falsifications in the election context will not be covered. Despite these
constitutional barriers, claims brought against creators of digital falsifications that
inflict grave dignitary harms might survive First Amendment scrutiny, though this
theory has not been tested in the courts.13
Defamation & False Light: A more fruitful avenue might be civil tort claims for
defamation and false light, which target certain types of falsehoods. Public officials
and public figures could sue if a convincing digital falsification amounted to a
defamatory statement of fact made with actual malice—that is, made with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to its
falsity.14 Private individuals, meanwhile, need show only that the creator was
negligent as to the falsity of any defamatory statement. Similarly, liability could
arise if a digital falsification places a person in a “false light” by creating a harmful
and false implication in the public’s eye, though the victim would have to show
actual malice if the falsification was related to a “matter of public concern.” 15
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED): A final tort that might come
into play is IIED, but only if the creator of a piece of synthetic or manipulated
media “intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that
caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” 16 This is a high bar to
meet, made higher by First Amendment concerns: as in defamation, a public

figure’s IIED claim resting on allegations of falsity must satisfy the strictures of
actual malice, and there is also robust constitutional protection for satire and
speech on matters of public concern.17
Criminal Law: Some digital falsifications might implicate various criminal laws. If
a digital falsification targeted particular individuals by using any “interactive
computer service or electronic communication system” to “intimidate” them in
ways “reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress,” the creator
might have violated federal cyberstalking law.18 Some states also make it a crime
to knowingly and credibly impersonate another person online with intent to “harm,
intimidate, threaten, or defraud” that person,19 and it is a federal crime to
impersonate a federal official in order to defraud others of something of value. 20 A
few states also have criminal defamation laws, though prosecutions under these
laws must at a minimum satisfy the same constitutional standards as the civil
defamation claims discussed above.21 Finally, some states have criminalized the
intentional use of lies to impact elections, but most of these laws have been struck
down as unconstitutional.22
Administrative Law: There may be narrow circumstances in which digital
falsifications could be addressed through administrative law. The Federal Trade
Commission could regulate synthetic or manipulated media that amount to
deceptive or unfair commercial acts and practices, but this remit would likely cover
only those media that take the form of advertising related to “food, drugs, devices,
services, or cosmetics.”23 Although the Federal Communications Commission
might seem like a better fit, that agency currently appears to lack both jurisdiction
and interest to regulate content circulated on social media.24 Lastly, the Federal
Election Commission is empowered to regulate campaign speech, but it does not
regulate the truth of campaign-related speech, nor is it likely to assert or receive
this power due to the constitutional, practical, and political concerns that would
accompany such efforts.25 There are election-related rules concerning financing—
for example, regulations demanding transparency of funding for political

advertisements—but social media are not currently subject to jurisdiction in this
context.26 This might change if Congress adopts the Honest Ads Act, but efforts
appear to have stalled on that front for now.27
Five final points are essential to understanding the legal landscape around digital
falsifications. First, difficulties of attribution will often impede attempts to hold
creators of harmful falsifications liable; tracking down the people who create them
is usually difficult and costly. Second, and relatedly, perpetrators often live outside
of the United States and thus may be beyond the reach of the U.S. legal process.
Third, it can be expensive and risky to bring civil claims, and victims of harmful
falsifications may fear that litigation will trigger even more unwanted attention—
sometimes known as the Streisand effect.28
Fourth, legal liability may depend on whether a digital falsification is believable,
but each case will present different issues on this front. For example, if a deepfake
portrayed a presidential candidate saying something racist, she would likely have
to show that people reasonably believed she made the racist statements in order to
successfully bring a defamation claim. If the deepfake were unbelievable, courts
would more likely view it as satire or parody and thus deem it protected under the
First Amendment.29 Although the relevance of believability will depend on the
type of legal claim and the facts of each case, it is safe to say that believable
falsifications are both more likely to be legally problematic and less likely to
receive First Amendment protection.
Last but certainly not least, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act will
largely immunize social media from most of the potential legal liability discussed
in this memo. If a third party posts a digital falsification on an online platform, the
platform cannot be held liable for hosting it even if the third party could be, unless
hosting the content violates federal criminal or intellectual property law. At the
very least, this means that platforms are not legally responsible for user-generated

falsifications that would otherwise run afoul of laws concerning the right of
publicity, defamation, false light, or IIED.
Section 230 is especially important here in two respects. First, platforms cannot be
sued for displaying most content republished from other sources or generated by
users because the law expressly prohibits courts from treating platforms as
“publishers” of that content. Second, platforms can filter and block whatever
content they like without fear that they will be liable for leaving up some types of
content while taking down others. This combination gives platforms wide
discretion to allow or prohibit digital falsifications as they see fit. Ultimately, due
to a combination of Section 230 and the First Amendment, platforms will be
largely free to regulate digital falsifications however they wish as a matter of
private governance of online speech.
Thomas E. Kadri is a resident fellow at Yale Law School and an adjunct professor
at New York Law School.
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